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chapter 9
Trinity, motion and creation ex nihilo
Simon Oliver
i n t roduct i on
The doctrine of creation ex nihilo apparently distinguishes theological
cosmology from ancient Greek conceptions of a universe which has no
temporal beginning (as in Aristotle) or a cosmos which is formed from pre-
existent chaos, the khora (as in Plato’s mythic cosmology, Timaeus). While
the theological doctrine of creation marks a signiﬁcant break from ancient
Greek cosmology, more recently some have argued for a congruence
between creation ex nihilo and contemporary Big Bang theories and the
notion that the universe had a temporal beginning in the form of a
singularity.1
Does Big Bang cosmology conﬁrm the doctrine of creation ex nihilo and
the teaching that ‘in the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth’?
Numerous cosmologists seem to interpret Big Bang cosmology in a way
which precludes the notion of creation and a creator. For example, some
account for the Big Bang in terms of a ﬂuctuation in a primal vacuum
known as ‘quantum tunnelling’ from nothing, from which the universe
expanded according to what is known as inﬂation theory. ‘Nothing’ is
deﬁned by the cosmologist Alexander Vilenkin as a state with no classical
space-time in which the basic categories of physics – space, time, energy,
entropy and so on – seem to lose their meaning. This utterly uncaused
emergence of the universe from nothing apparently accounts for the uni-
verse’s existence without reference to anything beyond the universe itself.2
The universe is simply a brute fact.
1 See, for example, Paul Copan and William Lane Craig, Creation out of Nothing: A Biblical,
Philosophical and Scientiﬁc Exploration (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2004), pp. 17–19 and
passim.
2 See Alexander Vilenkin, ‘Creation of Universes from Nothing’, Physics Letters 117B (1982), pp. 25–28,
cited in Mark William Worthing, God, Creation and Contemporary Physics (Minneapolis, MN:
Fortress Press, 1996), pp. 98–100. See also Vilenkin, ‘Boundary Conditions in Quantum
Cosmology’, Physical Review D 33:12 (1986), pp. 3,560–3,569; Vilenkin, ‘Birth of Inﬂationary
133
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511778063.011
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Durham University Library, on 09 Nov 2018 at 13:59:50, subject to the Cambridge Core
An alternative to the inﬂationary theory of cosmic origins is oﬀered by
Stephen Hawking who, in A Brief History of Time, sets forth the case for a
universe understood as ﬁnite and yet without beginning or end, rather like
the surface of a sphere. Hawking famously states: ‘So long as the universe
had a beginning, we could suppose it had a creator. But if the universe is
really completely self-contained, having no boundary or edge, it would have
neither beginning nor end: it would simply be. What place, then, for a
creator?’3
Whether one accepts the Big Bang understood as a temporal boundary to
the universe, as in the inﬂationary theory, or the Hawking model of a
beginningless universe which is nevertheless ﬁnite, neither approximates to
the doctrine of creation ex nihilo.4 Natural science cannot truly think the
nihil. Scientiﬁc cosmology still operates with the Aristotelian notion that ex
nihilo, nihil ﬁt. The vacuum of modern particle physics which ﬂuctuates to
bring the universe to existence through so-called quantum tunnelling is not
‘nothing’, for this ‘nothing’ is apparently subject to ﬂuctuation. As Thomas
Hobbes famously maintained against Robert Boyle and the vacuum in
Boyle’s air-pump, even a vacuum is not ‘nothing’: it still maintains a
material and political signiﬁcance.5 Even attempts by mathematical phys-
icists to identify ‘nothing’ with the empty mathematical set fail because, as
William Carroll points out, ‘the empty mathematical set . . . is subject to
the principles of logic and to the laws of quantum cosmology and, as such,
cannot be identiﬁed with absolute nothing’.6 Joseph Yciski puts it suc-
cinctly thus: ‘The alleged nothing [discussed in contemporary cosmology
by Hawking and others] turns out to be a complex reality of ordering
principles without which there would be no uniformity in nature and no
scientiﬁc study of natural phenomena would be possible.’7 Contemporary
cosmological speculation seems magically to reify the nihil.
Universes’, Physical ReviewD 27:12 (1983), pp. 2,848–2,855; Alan Guth, The Inﬂationary Universe: The
Quest for a New Theory of Cosmic Origins (Reading, MA: Perseus Books, 1997); and C. J. Isham,
‘Creation of the Universe as a Quantum Process’ in Robert John Russell, William R. Stoeger and
George V. Coyne (eds.), Physics, Philosophy and Theology: A CommonQuest for Understanding (Vatican
Observatory Publications, 2005), pp. 375–408.
3 Stephen Hawking, A Brief History of Time (London: Bantam Press, 1988), pp. 140–141.
4 Big Bang theory and quantum cosmology do not conﬂict with creation ex nihilo. They provide a
complementary, not alternative understanding of the origin of the universe, and of reality in general.
See W. Stoeger’s chapter in this volume for a defence of this claim from a scientiﬁc perspective.
5 See Stephen Shapin and Simon Schaﬀer, Leviathan and the Air-pump: Hobbes, Boyle and the
Experimental Life (Princeton University Press, 1989).
6 William Carroll, ‘Thomas Aquinas and Big Bang Cosmology’, at www2.nd.edu/Departments//
Maritain/ti/carroll.htm#N_12_.
7 Joseph Yciski, ‘Metaphysics and Epistemology in Stephen Hawking’s Theory of the Creation of the
Universe’, Zygon 31:2 (1996), p. 272, cited in Carroll, ‘Thomas Aquinas and Big Bang Cosmology’.
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Whereas those who ﬁrst formulated the doctrine of creation ex nihilo had
to attend to the ancient Greek understanding of a universe that has no
temporal beginning, so we must likewise attend to the tendency to reify the
nihil and the consequent diﬃculty of speaking of God’s act of creation from
nothing. How are we to express the utterly unique instance of the divine
creative act, and so distinguish God’s act of creation from any natural
process or human contrivance, so maintaining the radical nature of the
doctrine of creation shared by the ancient Abrahamic faiths?
In order to articulate the radical nature of ex nihilo and avoid any
tendency towards understanding creation as in any way univocal with
natural processes or human contrivances, I would like to consider the
doctrine of creation ex nihilo with reference primarily to the doctrine of
God. I will begin in the thirteenth century with Thomas Aquinas and the
way in which he distinguishes between God’s act of creation from nothing
and the subsequent nature of the universe, namely through the category of
motion. Creation is not, strictly speaking, a motion, whereas nature is
understood by Aquinas in Aristotelian fashion as a principle of motion
and rest.
I will oﬀer a brief examination of Aquinas’ understanding of motion,
creative emanation and God’s relation to a cosmos saturated with motion.
This will present us with a question. If we are to claim that a study of nature
involves, in the end, a study of motion, and creation ex nihilo does not fall
into this category of motion (that is, it is not a natural process), are we
establishing a division between the natural sciences on the one hand, and
theology on the other? Is theology deﬁned as that discourse about the
motionless, divine origin of the universe, whereas the natural sciences are
concerned only with motion, that is, natural processes which are, of
necessity, absent from the divine?
I will attempt a tentative answer to that question by describing the way in
which, for Aquinas, motion is analogically related to the eternal dynamism
of the Trinity. I will describe Aquinas’ understanding of creation as a
‘motion’ of emanation from God before considering emanation within
created beings and its relation to the eternal emanation of the persons of
the Trinity.We will see that, in the dynamism of the Holy Spirit proceeding
from the Father and Son, we ﬁnd the principle of natural motion. Motion,
then, is not the wedge between creation and creator, but the means of
creation’s participation in the divine.
Having considered motion in relation to the divine processions, creation
and emanation, I will turn to address the development of ideas latent
in Aquinas’ view by Hans Urs von Balthasar, referring particularly to
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Trinitarian theology, the ontology of love and the structure of motion. I will
suggest that Balthasar’s emphasis on diﬀerence within the Trinity as the
structure of love implies that motion, which, in its Platonic, Aristotelian and
Thomist guise, requires diﬀerence, is also structured as a kind of kenotic
self-donation.
In concluding this chapter, and in order to draw attention to the crucial
place of the Trinity in thinking about the true nature of creation ex nihilo, I
will examine the thought of Isaac Newton, the principle theorist of motion
in early modern science, to suggest why his voluntarist, Arian and Unitarian
theology prevented him from truly articulating the radical edge of the
traditional Christian doctrine of creation. We will see that Newton’s doc-
trine of God and understanding of motion paves the way for the separation
of faith and reason, and therefore the separation of theological cosmology
from the speculations of the natural sciences.
aqu i na s : c r e a t i on and emana t i on
Aquinas is frequently reluctant to describe God’s act of creation as any kind
of ‘motion’. Why? To answer this question, we need to understand how
Aquinas understands motion, which for us post-Newtonians seems to be a
simple category belonging to physics with little, if anything, to do with
theology or metaphysics.
Aquinas gleans much of his understanding from Aristotle. For Aristotle
and his successors, motion – kinesis – is a mysterious and broad category
which encompasses not only local motion of bodies through space, but also
the changes of, for example, growing, learning or thinking. These diﬀerent
varieties of motion are analyzed by means of the categories which are
fundamental to Aristotle’s metaphysics, most particularly potency and act.
At a general level, motion is passage from potency to act, and therefore the
means of the actualization, or perfection, of creatures. A student, for
example, is potentially knowledgeable concerning the history of France,
and, by the motion of learning, becomes actually knowledgeable concern-
ing the history of France. Aristotle identiﬁes motion as ‘the actualization of
what potentially is, qua potentiality’.8
As far as Aristotle is concerned, every motion must be caused by some-
thing which is, in some sense, in act with regard to the motion concerned.
For example, for something to move from cold to hot, it must be moved by
8 Aristotle, Physics iii.1.201a. On this deﬁnition of motion, see L. A. Kosman, ‘Aristotle’s Deﬁnition of
Motion’, Phronesis 14 (1969), pp. 40–62.
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something which is actually hot. In other words, there is always something
that is moved, and – in the end – there is always a mover. This is also why
Aristotle maintains his motor-causality principle which is so central to later
medieval natural philosophy: ‘omne quod movetur ab alio movetur’ (whatever
is moved is moved by another). Any motion can always be analyzed into the
mover and that which is moved. So motion is always relational for
Aristotle.9
Given an Aristotelian deﬁnition of motion which has at its heart the
passage from potency to act and the postulation of a subject which preceded
the motion, it is not surprising that Aquinas frequently avoids describing
God’s act of creation ex nihilo as any kind of ‘motion’. However, on other
occasions, Aquinas stretches his use of the term motus in such a way that it
can be employed at least metaphorically, but without error, of the divine
creative act and even of God’s immanent and perfectly subsistent intellec-
tive life.10 How can this be so? It is necessary to begin with an examination
of the character of emanation, for – as many commentators neglect to
mention – Aquinas refers to creation as ‘the emanation of things from the
ﬁrst principle’.11
It is important to recall at this stage that emanation is a term with a very
complex history. It is deployed in numerous ways in ancient pagan and
Christian thought, particularly within the Neoplatonic tradition. What
Aquinas means by this term is certainly not what Peter Lombard still
maintained a century earlier, namely that created natures emerge from
God in a hierarchy in such a way that creatures are created by those
immediately above them in that hierarchy. Neither does emanation refer
to a necessary emergence of creation from the Godhead. Emanation, for
Aquinas, concerns self-expression. It refers to the active self-expression of a
nature in relation to others in the production of another self. In the Summa
contra Gentiles he begins by noting that ‘one ﬁnds a diverse manner of
emanation in things, and, the higher a nature is, the more intimate to the
nature is that which ﬂows from it’.12 What does this mean? Take a ﬁre, for
9 For a more detailed discussion of motion and the interpretation of the principle ‘omne quod movetur
ab alio movetur’, see SimonOliver, Philosophy, God and Motion (London: Routledge, 2005), especially
Chapters 2 and 4; and James Weisheipl, Nature and Motion in the Middle Ages, ed. W. E. Carroll
(Washington, DC: The Catholic University Press of America, 1985).
10 For example, see Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles (hereafter, SCG), i.13.10. See also Summa Theologiae
(hereafter, ST ), ia.19.1, ad. 3 on the entirely subsistent movement of the divine will.
11 Aquinas, ST ia.45:De modo emanationis rerum a primo principio. For a discussion of divine emanation
and motion in relation to Aquinas’ understanding of the perfections of being, life and knowing, see
R. A. te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas (Leiden: Brill, 1995), pp. 272–279.
12 SCG iv.11.1.
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example. A ﬁre necessarily emanates a likeness of itself and so moves another
object from cold to hot. This emanation terminates outside the mover, in
the heating of another object.
For Aquinas, however, the highest form of emanation is not that which
terminates externally from the being concerned (for example, an inanimate
object locally moving another object) but that which has an internal
termination, for this implies an increasing degree of self-subsistence. We
ﬁnd a clear instance of emanation and return in the human intellect, for the
intellect is capable of self-knowledge and understanding. Thus a human
being is able to produce a communication of its nature, an emanation of
another self, in such a way that self-reﬂection is possible.When we reﬂect on
or think about ourselves, it is as if a version of ourselves emanates from our
intellect in such a way that we can, as it were, ‘look’ at ourselves. Yet the
human intellect is imperfect because it must take its ﬁrst knowledge – even
of itself – from without, namely through sense perception, before returning
from the external object to arrive at knowledge of itself by its relation to the
external object in question.13 I know myself not through myself, but in my
relation to external objects. I know myself, for example, as sat behind this
desk.
Perfect emanation is found in God whose intellect and act of under-
standing, unlike those of angels, are identical with his being. Therefore,
God’s being, intellect and understanding are one.14 For the divine to know
himself and express himself through that knowledge is the divine essence,
the very divine life itself. Aquinas goes on to maintain that God’s self-
knowledge, although perfect, unitary and eternal, still maintains distinc-
tion. This distinction consists in the God who expresses his self-knowledge
in himself and the God who is expressed or conceived, namely the Son who
is the expression of the self-knowledge of the Father. The former is a perfect
emanation of the latter in such a way that the being of both is identical and
this emanation remains entirely immanent.15
As well as God’s knowledge of himself through himself, Aquinas else-
where outlines the sense in which ideas subsist in the divine mind and are
therefore known by him.16 He claims that these ideas are forms of things
existing apart from things, and that the form of a thing can either be the
exemplar or pattern of the thing whose form it is said to be, or it can be
the means of knowing the thing whose form it is by its residing in the
knower. In both these aspects, ideas subsist in the mind of God. Yet, as
13 SCG ii.60. 14 SCG i.45.
15 On the diﬀerence between divine and human self-understanding, see SCG iv.11.11. 16 ST ia.15.1.
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regards the latter, it can be seen that it is by God’s interior self-knowledge,
namely the emanation of the Son from the Father, that he knows other
things by their proper ideas subsisting in him. In a sense, therefore, all
things are known primarily and per se as they exist most perfectly in God’s
knowledge, and as they are therefore known in God’s self-knowledge, in
God’s interior emanation.
Aquinas also describes the place of the Spirit within the divine emana-
tions and creative act.17 He seeks to make clear what we must understand of
the Spirit with regard to God’s immanent life and act of creation. Initially,
Aquinas examines intellectual natures in general and states that there must
be a will alongside intellect because such a nature must desire to know.18
Crucially, intellects are not merely passive recipients of ‘information’; all
knowledge is at once willed or desired knowledge. Just as any natural thing
has an inclination to its own proper operations, for ‘it tends to what is ﬁtting
[convenientia] for itself ’, so too an intellectual nature has an inclination,
which we call will, towards its own proper operation in knowledge.19
Aquinas claims that, of all the acts which belong to the will, love (amor) is
found to be a principle and common root. He describes this in terms of the
‘aﬃnity and correspondence’ (aﬃnitatem et convenientiam) between the
principle of inclination in natural things and that to which they are
moved. Thus, for example, if I am standing before a beautiful painting in
one of Rome’s magniﬁcent churches, a ‘species’ or ‘likeness’ of the painting
comes to reside in mymind. Meanwhile, the painting comes to reside in my
will because there is a certain ‘proportion and suitability’ – a convenientia –
between myself and the painting. My love of, or desire for, the painting
draws me to knowledge of the painting. The convenientia between my
intellect and will on the one hand, and the painting on the other, becomes
the principle behind my intellectual nature’s self-motion towards knowl-
edge of the object, that motive attraction being a form of love.
However, in contrast to intellectual beings such as angels or humans,
God is at one with his intellectual nature and, likewise, his will. The ﬁrst
and most appropriate object of the operation of the divine will – the object
of God’s desire – is the divine goodness, and so God, because God loves
himself and is beloved and lover, must be in his will as the beloved is in the
lover.20 The beloved is in the will of the lover by means of a ‘proportion and
suitability’ between the two. God has a most perfect proportion and
suitability with himself because he is simple. Therefore, God is in his will
with perfect simplicity. In addition, any act of will is, as Aquinas remarks, an
17 SCG iv.15ﬀ. 18 SCG iv.19.1ﬀ. 19 SCG iv.19.2. 20 SCG iv.19.7.
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act of love, but the act of the will is the divine being. So ‘the being of God in
his will by way of love is not an accidental one – as it is in us – but is essential
being’, hence the scriptural teaching that ‘God is love.’21
Coupled with what has been said of God’s self-knowledge in the ema-
nation of the Son, we now have a twofold picture of the divine life. On the
one hand, God loves himself because, as we have seen, the ‘proportionate
and appropriate’ end of God’s operative will is himself and his own good-
ness. Yet this would not be loved if it were not known, and God knows
himself through conceiving of himself in the eternal emanation of the
Word. Yet it is not quite adequate to say that it is God’s knowledge
which is beloved, for God’s knowledge is his essence. Therefore, coupled
with the emanation of the Word must be a love whereby the lover dwells in
the beloved, both in God’s knowing and in that which is known. The love
by which God is in the divine will as a lover in the beloved ‘proceeds both
from the Word of God and the God whose Word he is’.22 It is the Holy
Spirit. It is as if the Father is the lover and the Son the beloved, but
immediately and in eternity this is returned so the Son is the lover and
the Father the beloved. This introduces a kind of circular dynamism to the
inner divine life which Aquinas refers to as a kind of intellectual ‘motion’.23
With regard to God’s self-knowledge and self-love in the persons of the
Trinity, we now have a ﬂickering sense of how the universe can be said to
have the divine nature as its cause. Aquinas states that ‘eﬀects pre-exist in a
cause according to its mode of being. Since, then, God’s being is his actual
understanding, creatures pre-exist there as held in his mind.’24 Thus he
states, ‘God’s knowledge stands to all created things as the artist’s to his
products.’25 However, in addition to the knowledge of things, Aquinas also
notes that an act of will is necessary in the act of creating: creation ex nihilo is
not a necessary emanation. God is so inclined because his own subsistent
goodness wills that other things be in such a way that ‘by his will he
produces things in being’ and his self-love thereby becomes the cause of
the creation of things.26 In a similar fashion Aquinas elsewhere states that ‘It
is . . . from the fact that the Holy Spirit proceeds by way of love – and love
has a kind of driving and moving force – that the movement which is from
God in things seems properly to be attributed to the Holy Spirit.’27 It seems,
therefore, that God’s knowledge becomes the cause of creation and the
ground of the continual subsistence of the cosmos, while the Holy Spirit,
which proceeds from the Father and Son by way of love, is properly
21 Ibid.; 1 John 4:16. 22 SCG iv.19.8. 23 SCG iv.19.12. 24 ST ia.19.4, responsio.
25 ST ia.14.8, responsio. 26 SCG iv.19.12. 27 SCG iv.20.3.
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described as the principle of the motion of nature.28 This means that what
moves all things to their characteristic operation is love, namely a desire for
fulﬁlment in the beloved, a desire for fulﬁlment in God.
In what sense can this emanation and return to self in God be described
as any kind of motion? In answer, Aquinas begins by stating that there are
two kinds of action.29 The ﬁrst is that which passes to matter outside the
agent concerned, for example locally moving another body or the heating of
one body by another. The second is that which remains in the agent, for
example understanding, sensing or willing. In the case of the ﬁrst, the
motion is completed not in the agent of the motion, but in another. In
the second, the motion is the completion or perfection of the agent of the
motion. However, this latter is not motion in the strict Aristotelian sense of
the passage from contrary to contrary or the actualizing of the potential qua
potential. In Aristotelian terms, it may be regarded as energeia (actuality), a
kind of constant similar to seeing which is not temporally divisible into
parts. It is an activity which, at every moment, is the same, not having an
end outside itself.30 Therefore, Aquinas concludes, this ‘motion’ is diﬀerent
from the strict Aristotelian deﬁnition of the Physics. However, he does seem
willing to assimilate the Aristotelian view with the self-moving soul of Plato
when he writes:
Plato understood by motion any given operation, so that to understand and to
judge are a kind of motion. Aristotle likewise touches upon this manner of speaking
in the De Anima. Plato accordingly said that the ﬁrst mover moves himself because
he knows himself and wills or loves himself . . . There is no diﬀerence between
reaching a ﬁrst being that moves himself, as understood by Plato, and reaching a
ﬁrst being that is absolutely unmoved, as understood by Aristotle.31
Elsewhere, Aquinas explicitly states that life is especially manifested in
motion, and speciﬁcally in self-motion and those things which put them-
selves into operation.32 He states that, if love, drive and motion are partic-
ularly suited to the Holy Spirit, as Scripture suggests,33 it is here that we ﬁnd
the dynamism of the Trinitarian life fully expressed and mediated.
In expounding Aquinas in this way I am not attempting to give an
account of the causal mechanism of the universe’s creation. Creation ex
nihilo is not ordinary causality, so much as the intrinsic basis of all causality.
Neither do I wish slavishly to follow modern science’s tendency to privilege
the temporal origin of the cosmos in giving an account of the universe’s
28 SCG iv.20.3. 29 ST ia.18.3, ad. 1.
30 On Aristotle’s distinction between energeia and kinesis, see Metaphysics ix.6. 31 SCG i.13.10.
32 SCG iv.20.6. 33 Ibid. Aquinas mentions John 6:64 and Ezekiel 37:5.
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beginnings. Creation ex nihilo – the doctrine that creation, at everymoment,
is of nothing – as such privileges no particular temporal instant as revealing
more acutely the nature of the cosmos as suspended over the nihil. Rather,
my intention is to point to the way in which, for one of the most prominent
theologians of the Christian tradition, eﬀects analogically resemble their
causes. Creation and motion are apparently opposed, for the former
excludes the latter. Meanwhile, both are eﬀects of something more real.
They are reconciled and related, therefore, by their participation in the
eternal and perfectly subsistent emanation of the divine persons. Yet, while
Aquinas talks of emanation in creatures and God, he does so by analogy,
always aware that, however great the similitude, the dissimilitude is always
greater.
There is a sense, therefore, that if motion is the means of the perfection of
creatures – their passage to actuality – then we might understand motion to
be analogically related to the actuality of God’s inner Trinitarian dynamic. I
would now like to examine the way in which a more recent theologian, the
Swiss Roman Catholic Hans Urs von Balthasar, develops this Thomist
understanding of the doctrine of God and cosmic motion with particular
reference to an understanding of both creation and motion as relational.
More particularly, Balthasar moves beyond Aquinas in describing both
motion and creation as related by analogy to the eternal kenosis within
the Trinitarian Godhead.
b a l tha s a r : d i f f e r enc e and the d ynam i sm of
t r i n i t a r i an lov e
The life of God, for Balthasar, is characterized by self-donation in the
form of kenosis.34 The revelation of this self-giving is recorded in
the hymn to Christ’s self-emptying in the incarnation in Philippians 2.
Within the economy of salvation, this kenosis reaches its greatest intensity
on Holy Saturday when God, in sovereign freedom, endures the derelic-
tion of godlessness. Yet it is crucial for Balthasar that this kenotic moment
is not an arbitrary act of God, as if the divine had suddenly become
subject to godlessness in order to be fully himself (as in the thought of
Jürgen Moltmann). Rather, it is suﬀering and dereliction which are made
subject to God, and the godlessness of Holy Saturday is always the
34 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, trans. G. Harrison, vol. iv (San
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994), pp. 325ﬀ.
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economic outworking of God’s immanent and eternal kenosis.35 It is at
this moment in the economy of salvation that it is revealed that even that
which is not God is brought to be subject to God. Moreover, as Graham
Ward observes, this kenosis is not christomonistic, an act conﬁned to
Christ’s incarnation and cruciﬁxion. Rather, divine kenosis, as Trinitarian
and eternal, is the possibility of God’s self-giving within the economy of
salvation.36 As Aquinas refers to the eternal emanation of the Son from the
Father, so for Balthasar the Father pours out his life without remainder in
the Son’s eternal begetting. The Son’s response is kenotic eucharistia, thus
constituting a ‘eucharistic movement back and forth from the Father’.37
Importantly, the self-donation of the Father is also the self-reception of
the Son, thus constituting the relational nature of the eternal divine gift:
self-donation and self-reception are one. This love cannot be contained
within an enclosed dyad, but opens in eternity in the procession of the
Spirit who maintains the inﬁnite diﬀerence between Father and Son. This
inﬁnite diastasis is revealed in the Son’s cry of dereliction on the cross and
the silence of Holy Saturday.38 Within that hiatus is contained not only
sin, but the whole of creation, for the ‘otherness’ of creation – the
ontological diﬀerence – is itself the imago of the inﬁnite diﬀerence
which is being itself, namely the diﬀerence of the divine persons.
Balthasar writes:
If, within God’s identity, there is an Other, who at the same time is the image of the
Father and thus the archetype of all that can be created; if, within this identity,
there is a Spirit, who is the free, superabundant love of the ‘One’ and of the ‘Other’,
then both the otherness of creation, which is modelled on the archetypal otherness
35 Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, trans. E. Leiva-Kerikakis, vol. i (San
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1982), p. 461: ‘God’s incomprehensibility is now no longer a mere
deﬁciency in knowledge, but the positive manner in which God has loved us so much that he
surrendered his only Son for us, the fact that the God of plenitude has poured himself out, not only
into creation, but emptied himself into the modalities of an existence determined by sin, corrupted
by death and alienated from God.’ Crucially, in maintaining that Christ’s kenosis on the cross is the
economic outworking of God’s eternal kenosis, Balthasar is not suggesting that there is an eternal
suﬀering in God. Rather, within a sinful world, the cross is the way in which eternal love manifests
itself. It is the way in which the eternal love of God, which has always ﬂowed to creation, is
maintained in its self-giving in the face of sin. I am grateful to D.C. Schindler for highlighting this
point to me.
36 See G. Ward, ‘Kenosis: Death, Discourse and Resurrection’ in L. Gardner, D. Moss, B. Quash and
G. Ward (eds.), Balthasar at the End of Modernity (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999), pp. 15–68, at
pp. 44–45.
37 Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, trans. G. Harrison, vol. ii (San Francisco:
Ignatius Press, 1990), p. 268.
38 See Balthasar,Mysterium Paschale: The Mystery of Easter, trans. A. Nichols (Edinburgh: T&T Clark,
1990).
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within God, and its sheer existence, which it owes to the intradivine liberality, are
brought into a positive relationship to God.39
In fact, for Balthasar, it is only the diﬀerence inherent within being itself
which makes creaturely diﬀerence intelligible – especially the diﬀerence
within all creatures, that between essence and existence.40
The Trinitarian diﬀerence within the Godhead and the diﬀerence of
essence and existence in creation indicate, for Balthasar, ‘both a similitudo
(insofar as the multiplicity of creatures is one in esse) and a maior dissimil-
itudo, insofar as nondivine being necessarily cleaves in two and stands over
against the divine identity in the form of non-identity’.41 This is to say that
the diversity within creation is not to be interpreted as a fall, but is rather a
participation in the Trinitarian diﬀerence of the Godhead.42 Yet, because of
the ontological diﬀerence in which the essence of non-subsistent creatures is
not one with their existence, the resemblance or similitudo is, as Aquinas
would say, one of creatures to God, and not of God to creatures.43 Likewise,
Balthasar refuses to mitigate the ontological diﬀerence.
So what, for Balthasar, is the nature of the analogia entis through which
creation is formed as an imago of the eternal Godhead? For Balthasar, this
must be kenosis which is itself the form of love. As Ward notes, the view
that love is kenotic has strong precedent in the early Church: love is self-
abandonment and gift, whereas sin is the attempt at self-possession as a
rejection of self-donation.44 Kenotic love is a self-donation, not a ‘giving-
up’. This economy of love involves reception and therefore the relationality
and diﬀerence of the giver and the recipient.45 In a move seemingly beyond
Aquinas, and with an eye on the dangers of subordinationism, it is kenotic
love which is elevated to the heart of Balthasar’s theology:
But if we reﬂect once more on the process of the intradivine processions, two
approaches are barred to us: the idea of a Father who generates the Son in order to
come to know himself as God and the idea of a Father who, because he has already
39 Balthasar, Theo-Logic: Theological Logic Theory, trans. A. Walker, vol. ii (San Francisco: Ignatius
Press, 2004), pp. 180–181. See also Balthasar, Theo-Drama, vol. iv, p. 323.
40 Balthasar, Theo-Logic, vol. ii, p. 182. This is not to suggest in any way that ‘diﬀerence’ is a
straightforward concept. It is beyond the immediate purview of this chapter to enter into a detailed
discussion. For such an assessment of the diﬃculty of ‘thinking diﬀerence’, see R. Williams,
‘Afterword: Making Diﬀerence’ in L. Gardner, D. Moss, B. Quash and G. Ward (eds.), Balthasar
at the End of Modernity (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999), pp. 173–179.
41 Balthasar, Theo-Logic, vol. ii, p. 183. 42 Ibid., pp. 184–185. 43 See, for example, ST ia.4.3.
44 Ward, ‘Kenosis’, p. 46.
45 For an exacting theological analysis of the theology of gift, including a critique of Derrida’s notion of
the ‘one-way’ gift, see John Milbank, Being Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon (London: Routledge,
2003).
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known himself perfectly, generates the Son. The ﬁrst position would be
Hegelianism, the second, thought through consistently, would be Arianism. For
this reason, the immemorial priority of the self-surrender or self-expropriation
thanks to which the Father is Father cannot be ascribed to knowledge but only to
groundless love, which proves the identity of love as the ‘transcendental par
excellence’.46
As the ‘transcendental par excellence’, it is love alone which is credible as
our means of understanding God’s revelation of himself and creation’s
analogical relation to its divine source. Creation bears the marks of its
origin: the love of God which is kenotic in nature. So created entities are
understood to participate in the eternal kenosis of the persons of the Trinity
by continually giving themselves to be seen, known, understood and
delighted in. As Rowan Williams points out, reality is therefore kenotic
and ek-static for Balthasar, for all things continually move out of themselves
in self-donation.47
Howmight kenotic love at the heart of divine being, and its concomitant
image in creation, illuminate the nature of cosmic motion? To answer this
question, it is necessary to refer to the speciﬁcs of the Aristotelian–Thomist
understanding of motion. It must be remembered that motion prior to the
advent of modern natural philosophy is a broad category referring not only
to the locomotion of bodies in space, but also to the motions of quality and
quantity: learning, growing and maturing in character, for example, are
varieties of motion. Central to Aristotle’s and Aquinas’ concept of motion is
diﬀerence, which is also integral to Balthasar’s understanding of love. For
Aquinas, following both Plato and Aristotle, motion is always relational:
there is a mover and that which is moved. Motion takes place between
contraries (for example, black and white, ignorance and knowledge) and is
passage from potency to act. It is a necessary condition for motion that there
be something in act and something in potency with regard to the motion in
hand.
Crucially, therefore, motion requires the diﬀerence of mover and moved,
and the diﬀerence of potency and act. There is also a sense in which motion
might also be described as ecstatic and even kenotic. I have already alluded
to the distinction made by Aristotle between energeia (actuality) and kinesis
(motion). The being of something in motion is always constituted by its
relation to a mover as it passes ‘beyond itself ’ from potency to act. At every
46 Balthasar, Theo-Logic, vol. ii, p. 177.
47 See R. Williams, ‘Balthasar and the Trinity’ in E. Oakes and D. Moss (eds.), The Cambridge
Companion to Hans Urs von Balthasar (Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 37–50, at p. 41.
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moment of the motion, that which is in motion is exceeding itself as it
receives a new form and progresses towards actuality. Therefore, Aristotle
characterizes motion as an ecstasis in which a being may receive a new form
which is bestowed by its mover. Because nature is identiﬁed more partic-
ularly with form rather than matter, motion for Aristotle and Aquinas is a
genuine transformation whereby something may receive a new form. By
contrast, the being of what is fully actual is self-contained and, unlike that
which is in motion, it is at every moment self-identical. However, this is not
to say that an energic being is self-enclosed. Quite the contrary is the case,
for such actualized beings are the most potent and ready movers of those in
potentiality.
In what sense might motion be kenotic in character? In any motion, the
mover ‘donates’ the form it already possesses and pours this into that which
it moves. For example, in the case of the motion of learning, the teacher
donates knowledge or the means of thought in such a way that the student,
who is moved to knowledge, receives a genuinely new form. It is not the case
that the teacher ‘gives up’ knowledge in order to bring a student from
potency to act; rather, this motion is brought about through self-donation.
That which is moved receives and seeks a new actuality through desire. It is
therefore not the case that creation is simply a series of ultimately passive
objects which are moved or manipulated in mechanical fashion by a divine
subject. Rather, creation participates in being moved by God, for in its
cosmic motion creation exhibits the desire for its natural end in the divine.
Where humanity fails of its own power to participate in its motion by God,
the divine provides the gift of grace whereby humanity may once again
seek motion to the beatiﬁc vision.48
Motion, therefore, requires diﬀerence and is ecstatic and kenotic in
character. Motion is the temporal image of the diﬀerentiated, ecstatic and
kenotic self-donation and self-reception which characterizes the Trinitarian
divine life. Cosmic motion is the ‘watermark’ of creation’s divine origin,
representing a similitudo – which is yet amaior dissimilitudo – of the cosmos
to the divine life. This ‘watermark’ is the kenotic self-donation of love which
moves the sun and other stars.
Moving to the last brief section of this chapter, I would now like to
contrast this understanding of cosmic origins and motion with the theology
and cosmology of the greatest theorist of motion in early modern science,
Isaac Newton. Following theologians including Michael Buckley, I see here
48 On motion and grace, see Simon Oliver, ‘The Sweet Delight of Virtue and Grace in Aquinas’s
Ethics’, International Journal of Systematic Theology 7:1 (2005), pp. 52–71.
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the beginnings of the separation of cosmology from issues in theology and
metaphysics, and the sundering of faith and reason.49
newton on god and mot i on
It is now commonly known that Isaac Newton, whose great work,
the Principia Mathematica, was published in 1687, wrote far more theology
than he did science. Because he denied the divinity of Christ and the
doctrine of the Trinity – thus putting at grave risk his position at Trinity
College, Cambridge – Newton, however, did not publish his theological
manuscripts.50
Newton expounded his Arian views of Christ at least ﬁfteen years prior to
the publication of the Principia. There are two principal reasons why
Newton held such an Arian view of God. The ﬁrst relates to studies in
biblical interpretation and religious history which he initially undertook in
earnest between the late 1660s and the mid-1680s, and to which he was to
return in the early part of the eighteenth century. Through his studies,
Newton became convinced that the earliest Christian Church held an
authentic and uncorrupted non-Trinitarian faith which understood
Christ as an exalted and yet created mediator between God and the
universe.
The second reason for Newton’s Arianism, and one which was at the
same time a consequence of this Christology, is more explicit and, although
this view was undoubtedly formulated much earlier, it appears in the
General Scholium of the second and third editions of the Principia. This
was the belief in the utter supremacy, power and freedom of the will of the
Lord God of Dominion.51 It was a supremely free and sovereign will which,
for Newton, was the supreme attribute of God. Because this will was
supremely free, this entailed its inscrutability and arbitrary character. It
was because of God’s omnipotent wilful dominion alone that he was worthy
of worship. This voluntarism featured a dualistic distinction between God’s
potentia ordinata and potentia absoluta. It was by the former that God
ordained and preserved the regular workings of the laws of nature.
However, in the latter was enshrined the absolute power of God’s will to
49 See M. Buckley, At the Origins of Modern Atheism (Yale University Press, 1987).
50 At the time of writing, Newton’s manuscripts are being made available on the Internet by a project
substantially sponsored by the Arts andHumanities Research Council and the Royal Society, at www.
newtonproject.sussex.ac.uk.
51 See Isaac Newton,The Principia:Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, trans. I. B. Cohen and
A. Whitman (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 939–944.
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suspend or change these laws at any moment. This was a kind of arbitrary
‘addition’ to God’s potentia ordinata.
Newton’s voluntarist Lord God of Dominion as described above was
utterly remote and transcendent. This concept of the divine ﬁtted neatly
with Newton’s physics in which the universe was seen to be ﬁlled with
discrete objects whose particular motion required no reference to a relation
with any other being. Interaction between discrete objects constituted
change brought about by conﬂictual forces. Remember that, according to
Newton’s ﬁrst law of motion, a body will continue in its state of motion or
rest until it is subject to another force. Motion is a state, and any body will
naturally resist a change in that state. What Newton is primarily concerned
with is not motion per se, but forces which change a state of motion.
Through the natural resistance to change possessed by bodies, the universe
exhibited some degree of stability and changelessness, this being a reﬂection
of the divine nature itself. However, this left a theological gap for Newton
which was somewhat unpalatable: how was he to describe a mode of divine
action within such a world so as not to make God incidental to cosmology?
Newton gave two apparently diﬀerent answers to this question. The ﬁrst,
in typical Arian fashion, saw the divine as utterly remote and acting through
Christ as an intermediary. God and Christ were not one in substance, but
one in unity of will and dominion. Newton states that, on this view, Christ
is understood as the ‘viceroy’ of God, putting into action the dictates of the
divine will. The second means of divine action, however, is direct within
absolute space. J. E. McGuire has argued that this latter form of divine
action shows that Newton’s Arianism was limited in its eﬀect upon his
cosmology.52 However, I will suggest that the latter notion of divine action
is also the result of Newton’s Arianism and that this conception of God
reinforces his understanding of motion.
Absolute space is the context and basis for motion in Newton’s universe.
He outlined his notion of space in De Gravitatione et Aequipondio
Fluidorum, a treatise which was to form the basis of many arguments in
the ﬁrst edition of the Principia.53 Newton explains that space is neither
substance nor accident, but rather ‘an eminent eﬀect of God, or a disposi-
tion of all being’.54 Space is ultimately characterized as extension. We are
52 See J. E. McGuire, ‘The Fate of the Date: The Theology of Newton’s Principia Revisited’ in M. J.
Osler (ed.), Rethinking the Scientiﬁc Revolution (Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 271–295.
53 This text is available in A. R. Hall andM.B. Hall (eds.),Unpublished Scientiﬁc Papers of Isaac Newton:
A Selection from the Portsmouth Collection in the University Library, Cambridge (Cambridge University
Press, 1962), pp. 89–156.
54 Ibid., p. 132.
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able to abstract ‘the dispositions and properties of a body so that there
remains only the uniform and unlimited stretching out of space in length,
breadth and depth’.55 Space is also ‘eternal in duration and immutable in
nature, and this because it is the emanent eﬀect of an eternal and immutable
being’.56 In a fashion which appears to consider space as ‘begotten’ of God,
Newton explains that, ‘If ever space had not existed, God at that time would
have been nowhere; and hence either he created space later (in which he was
not himself ), or else, which is less repugnant to reason, he created his own
ubiquity.’57
Thus it can be seen that, in the absence of a fully divine Christ, absolute
space becomes the basis of creation, forming the ‘disposition of being qua
being’, for such space is eternal in duration and immutable in nature, and
this because it is the emanent eﬀect of an eternal and immutable being.
While space is not literally God’s sensory medium, it is diﬃcult to avoid the
conclusion that Newton has described a spatial and three-dimensional
Godhead. Indeed, Newton’s absolute space – eternally of God, as it
were – takes on the characteristics of an orthodox second person of the
Trinity. Whereas, for Aquinas, God creates and sustains the world through
the Son’s emanation from the Father, so for Newton, God creates the world
in a co-eternal and uncreated absolute space through the exercise of his will.
It seems, therefore, that absolute space coupled with the action of the
divine will is the ontological precondition of all being. It is by means of
co-eternal and inﬁnite space that God is able to operate and instantiate a
material cosmos. Whereas, for Aquinas (and those in the broad Thomist
tradition such as Balthasar), the motion of a body is itself a participation and
eﬀect of the knowledge of the body’s form in the perfect ‘motionless
motion’ of God, namely in the emanation of the Son from the Father, for
Newton, creation occurs through the inscrutable and arbitrary ‘motions’ of
the divine will. This is expressed in a recent article by J. E. McGuire in
which he states that, for Newton, ‘God does not recreate similar conditions
in successive regions of space; he maintains the same formal reality in
diﬀerent parts of space through a succession of times. In this way the
continuity of motion is the real eﬀect of God’s motion.’58
Yet what divine motions can these be within Newton’s Arian voluntar-
ism? They can only be the motions of an arbitrary and inscrutable divine
will.Whereas, for Aquinas, the ‘motionless motion’ of the divine emanation
was able to provide the ontological basis and goal of all motion, for Newton,
who has already discounted the possibility of relationality within the
55 Ibid., p. 133. 56 Ibid., p. 136. 57 Ibid., p. 137. 58 McGuire, ‘The Fate of the Date’, p. 282.
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Godhead, motion can only be the eﬀect of the imposition of divine volition.
The lack of Trinitarian relationality in Newton’s conception of God means
that the universe cannot be thought of as a hierarchy and system of related
motions which are images of the divine life, but rather as the action of one
being, God, within absolute space to instantiate a material body, where-
upon the created being retains a primitive state of motion which is discrete
and self-explanatory.
conclu s i on
Where does this leave us? There is a question which pervades the traditional
reﬂection on creation which is pertinent: could a single, monadic, non-
relational divinity of Newtonian variety ‘create’? Some, including recently
TomWeinandy in the spirit of Balthasar, argue no.59 Weinandy states that:
If God were a solitary monad existing in complete self-isolation, the ‘thought’ of
creating something other than himself could never arise. It would be ontologically
impossible for the thought of ‘another’ to arise, for there would be no ontological
ground upon which this thought of ‘another’ could arise. Being the sole being that
existed, it would be impossible for a single-person God to conceive of anything
other than himself.60
This is why one might suppose that a monadic personal God must create
of necessity in order to be personal, for being personal necessitates relation-
ality. Alternatively, a monadic God, in order to conceive of something other
than himself, must create not ex nihilo, but out of a non-temporally
bounded, always existent ‘other’ in the form of a pre-existent material
nature akin to Aristotle’s eternal cosmos or Plato’s khora. It would then
be God’s relation to this eternal Aristotelian cosmos which was the basis of
God’s creating of an other.
Because Newton proposes just such a deity – a God devoid of relation-
ality and characterized by freedom understood in terms of an arbitrary, all-
powerful and inscrutable will – he cannot properly think creation ex nihilo.
Rather, creation emerges within a co-eternal absolute space which then
forms the basis of God’s relation to his creation, an absolute space which,
bizarrely, takes on the characteristics of an orthodox Christ. Moreover,
there can be no reason intrinsic to God himself concerning why he would
create. This is beyond intelligibility and reason, for the divine will, in being
sovereign and free, is not bounded by ‘reasons’ for creating. The
59 See Balthasar, Theo-Logic, vol. ii, p. 181.
60 Thomas Weinandy, Does God Suﬀer? (University of Notre Dame Press, 2000), pp. 139–140, note 75.
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consequence of the combination of Newton’s theology and natural phil-
osophy is a sense that creation – as a theological doctrine – stands outside
the realm of reason, whereas the natural processes under examination in the
Principia are merely the instantiation of an inscrutable divine will and
the subject of a wholly autonomous natural philosophy. Moreover, with
the central characteristic of nature – motion – understood non-relationally
and through the category of force, there seems no basis of relating such
motion to the life of God, as there had been in Aquinas where motion is
understood as an analogue of the supreme relationality of the Trinity. It
therefore comes as no surprise that early modern science divested itself so
easily of metaphysical and theological concerns.
Properly to think creation ex nihilo, one requires a doctrine of God which
is suﬃciently rich, such that God himself is the full and wholly adequate
reason not only for the universe’s temporal beginning (if, indeed, we can
properly conceive of such a thing), but also for God’s continual sustaining
of creation over the nihil. This, I would suggest, following Aquinas and
Balthasar, is found only in a fully Trinitarian doctrine. The relation of God
to the kenotic act of creation is analogically related to God’s kenotic self-
relation in the emanation of the persons of the Trinity. This much is
proposed by, among others, Barth, Pannenberg and Torrance. Going just
a little further, what I have also suggested is that the dynamic eternal
emanations within the Godhead are also related by analogy to cosmic
motion – the means of creaturely perfection – where motion is understood
as fundamentally relational and the key characteristic of the cosmos. We
might even suggest that God continually ‘moves’ creation from nothingness
to being. Because such a doctrine of God is suﬃciently rich that we need not
postulate anything other than God to account for creation, this can be the
only way of truly thinking creation which is of nothing, thereby maintain-
ing the distinctiveness of theological cosmology and avoiding the reiﬁcation
of the nihil. As I have argued in more detail elsewhere, this also allows us to
understand the subject matter of physics – motion – as included and taken
up within the subject matter of theology by virtue of motion’s analogical
relation to the doctrine of God.61 Meanwhile, we would do well to remem-
ber that, for theologians such as Aquinas and Balthasar, the doctrine of
creation ex nihilo is ﬁrst a doctrine of God and only then a cosmology.
61 See Oliver, Philosophy, God and Motion, esp. Chapter 6.
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